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1 Introduction
The purpose of this note is twofold: (1) to give the background in the paper by Gu et al. (2016) on the
tri‐level optimization model for private road competition problem with traffic equilibrium constraints, and
(2) to summarize the main idea and model in that paper.
In recent years, due to the funds limitation, there has been a growing trend for governments to allow
private participation in some major public investments, especially for infrastructure projects, such as ex‐
pressways and highway, under a procurement system called build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) (Roth, 1996).
Under this scheme, the project sponsor is responsible for financing, construction and operating roads, and
in retum, should receive the revenue from road toll charge for some years. After that, the roads will be
transferred to the government. The major motivation for the BOT scheme is that the government does not
need to spend any public funding while the public infrastructure can still be constructed.
Meanwhile, the private firms can enjoy a high potential profit from a successful BOC project. There are
many research works in the literature discussing the problem of public‐private‐partnership in transportation
infrastructure construction. Given an existing transport network system, to alleviate the traffic congestion,
the government decides to develop certain number of new roads. However, the government has limited
fund and can not afford to invest in building up all of these roads, so the private firms are encouraged to
participate the development of these new roads. Yang et al. (2009) considered a toll road competition under
a traffic network of BAT. There are two or more different participating private firms and the firms can make
their own optimal decisions on both the investment (capacity) and toll charges. The equilibrium problem is
solved based on the assumption that the private firms determine their operation strategies on multiple toll
roads in a road network to maximize their profit. However, if all the new roads are built and operated by
private firms under the BOT scheme, as was assumed in Yang et al. (2009), the primary objectives of all the
private firms are to maximize their profits, which is deviated from the original target of traffic congestion




Noting that only private participation in the road competition problemmay lead to a less efficient system
and result in a traffic network performance that is deviated from the desired social welfare maximization
case, it is imperative for the government to understand what role the government should play in the situation
of co1nmercialization and private supply of road and how the government should determine the optimal
participation strategy ensuring the proper usage ofprivate road. In Yang et al. (2009), the government played
a less important role in the system: not being able to participate the new road construction and operation, the
govemment can only use regulations to manage the system, which would bemuch less efficient in achieving
the goal ofmaximizing social welfare of the system.
If government controls some tolled roads, it is possible to influence the operation strategies of private
roads to avoid the reduced social welfare, and at the same time guarantee the private enterprises can gain
the profit. OUviously, the answer to these questions and issues remain unclear and will be addressed in this
study.
In the paper (Gu and Cai, 2016), we study the problem that how the government should take part in the
road competition while taking into consideration ofthe private firns responsive strategies and the travelers
equilibrium travel pattern. It is assumed that the government plans to construct certain number of new roads
to improve the transport network performance. Whilemost of the new roads would be built up by the private
firms underBOT scheme, the government itselfwould also participate in the road construction and operation
on certain new roads. By doing so, it will be more efficient for the government to achieve the goal of best
managing the network traffic and maximizing the social welfare, as compared to the case of letting all the
new roads constructed and operated by only profit‐maximizing private firms under BOT scheme. Because of
the target is that basing on getting the social welfare to make the firms compete to each other by themselves.
The government doesnt compete with the private firms. It plays as the guide and wants to lead to more
invest from the firms for the roads while doesnt let them to bid up price. Therefor, the one‐shot game and
Stackelberg game is not exact suitable for our model.
We proposed a tri‐level mathematical programming model formulate this problem and propose a heuris‐
tic algorithm to solve this model. The upper level program determines the optimal toll to maximize the
social welfare.
The middle level describes the private firms optimal strategies on their investment (road capacities) and
toll charge that maximizes their profits in response to the governments road toll decision.
In the lower level, the user equilibrium traffic assignment is conducted, assuming all the road usersmake
route choices following the deterministic user equilibrium principle (Wardrop, 1952). And we formulate it
as a finite‐dimensional variational inequality and solve it by projection‐type method with BB step size (He
et al., 2012).
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2 Traffic Network Description
We consider a directed transportation network G=(N, A) , consisting of a set N of nodes and a set A of
links whose elements are ordered pairs of distinct nodes.
The following are the notations used in this paper:
v_{a} : the flow on link a\in A , and v= (v_{a} : a\in A)^{T} be the vectors oflink flows,
t_{a} : an associated flow‐dependent cost to a , is assumed to be differentiable and monotonically increasing
with the amount of flow v_{a} , and t(v)=(t_{a}(v_{a}) : a\in A)^{T} be the vector of link travel cost,
W : the set ofOrigin‐Destination (OD) pairs,
R_{u} : the set of all paths connecting OD pair w\in W , and R=\displaystyle \bigcup_{w\in W}R_{w},
d_{w} : the traffic demand traveling between OD pair w\in W , and d= (d_{w} : w\in W)^{T} be the vectors of OD
demands,
f_{rw} : the flow on path r\in R_{w} ofOD pair w\in W , and f= (f_{rw} : r\in R_{w}, w\in W)^{T} be the vectors of all
path flows,
c_{rw} : the travel cost along a path r\in R_{w} of OD pair w\in W , is the sum of travel costs on all links that
compnse the path, i.e, c_{rw}=\displaystyle \sum_{a\in r}t_{a}(v_{a}) , and c=(c_{rw} : r\in R_{w}, w\in W)^{T} be the column vectors
of path travel cost,
$\mu$_{w} : the minimum path cost of OD pair w\in W , defined as $\mu$_{w}=\displaystyle \min\{c_{rw} : r\in R_{w}\} , and  $\mu$=($\mu$_{w} :
w\in W)^{T},
 $\Delta$ : \triangle=[$\Delta$_{ar}] be the link‐path incidence matrix, where $\Delta$_{ar} equals 1 if path r includes link a and 0
otherwise,




The WholeModel: The problem under consideration can be formulated as:
(Upper level) \displaystyle \max  W( $\tau$)=(\displaystyle \sum_{w\in W}\int_{0}^{d_{w}}B_{w}( $\omega$)\mathrm{d} $\omega$-\sum_{a\in A}v_{a}t(v_{a})-\sum_{a\in J,a\in K}\frac{1}{ $\beta$} $\eta$ I_{a})- $\rho$\sum_{i\in K}\frac{1}{ $\beta$}$\tau$_{i}v\int 1 )
s.t. $\tau$_{i}v_{i}\geq $\eta$ I_{i}, i\in K, \langle2)
(Middle level) (u_{\dot{}}, y_{j})\in S_{l_{2}}^{j}, j\in J, (3)
(Lower level) (v, d)\in S_{l_{1}} . (4)
Note that A is the set of all links in the network and K\subseteq A, J\subseteq A.
4 Heuristic Algorithm
Similar to the method in solving the EPEC problem, here we propose a heuristic method for the computation
of the tri‐level optimization problem, a synchronous iterative method.
The user equilibrium problem can be formulated as a finite‐dimensional Variational Inequality (VI)
(Facchinei, 2003). We describe the reformulatedVI formally and then adopt the recently developed projection‐
type method with BB step size to solve it (He et al. 2012).
From practical point of view, the government should adjust the level of its tolls as less as possible.
Therefore we can control the upper iteration number for some suitable figure. While on the other hand,
private companies can make appropriate adjustments according to the information of the govemments toll
level and the users choice, and choose their own optimal strategies.
We have to point out that the study of this tri‐level optimization is still in its infancy, and the computation
of a global solution is difficult, if not impossible; this can be observed from the special case of solving
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), i.e., the govemment does not involve in the
system. The issue of convergence of the heuristic methods will be addressed in the future study.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the situation in which the govemment, devoting tomaximize the social welfare, and
the private company, urging formaximum profit, exist in the same road network and operate different tolled
roads simultaneously. Envisaging that the participation of govemment in new road construction alongside
with private firms \mathrm{B} $\sigma$ \mathrm{r} scheme would better manage the network traffic and achieve the governments
33
goal of maximizing social welfare, we analyzed the interaction relationship of pricing, road capacity and
competition and how the road capacity and price are settled by using game theoretical model.
We develop a tri‐level model to describe the problem. A heuristic solution algorithm is proposed to
solve the model. The mode results indicate that the model is meaningful as the fundamental role for the
govemment is to make increase in social welfare.
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